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Key message

That climate risks are security risks is now largely a matter of international consensus. At the same time, political and financial priorities are partly moving in the opposite direction: defence spending is rising, while funding for prevention, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance is under pressure.

The Berlin Climate and Security Conference 2026 therefore exposed an implementation problem rather than a knowledge problem. The decisive question is no longer whether climate change affects security. It is: how do we translate what we already know about climate risks into timely, locally effective and cross-sectoral decisions?

Context

The German think tank adelphi hosted the BCSC, including side events, from 5 to 7 October 2026 together with the German Federal Foreign Office. According to adelphi, more than 300 representatives of governments, the armed forces, the United Nations, development banks, civil society and academia discussed climate security from a range of institutional perspectives.

The international perception of climate risks is shifting rapidly. Climate change is increasingly understood as a matter of peace, security and geopolitical stability, and climate security has become one of the central issues of international security policy – as shown by the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, co-chaired by Germany and Nauru, which now has 81 members. NATO, too, is paying increasing attention to the security implications of climate change.

Yet this growing political consensus faces a difficult reality. While the security relevance of climate risks is widely recognised, the very investments that could reduce those risks early – prevention, adaptation, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance – are under pressure. At the same time, the debate is widening: for the first time, solar geoengineering was on the BCSC agenda – not primarily as a technological option, but with a view to its potential security, governance and geopolitical risks. All of this sharpened an increasingly urgent question: how does knowledge about climate risks become the capacity to act?

The discussions showed that there is no shortage of concepts or data. The real challenge lies in understanding risks across sectoral and institutional boundaries, making local vulnerabilities visible, and designing finance and decision-making processes so that timely action actually becomes possible. This interface between knowledge, decision and implementation is where the central implementation gap of today’s climate security policy lies.

The panel discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule; statements are therefore reported without attribution.

Key insights

1. Climate risks are cascades – not isolated events

The conference made clear that climate risks rarely end where they originate.

Drought and failing rains can destabilise food systems and be instrumentalised by parties to a conflict. Falling water levels in the Panama Canal can disrupt global supply chains. Harvest failures in Asia affect food prices worldwide. Changes in the Middle East or along strategic sea routes can have global economic consequences.

A regional climate shock can thus become a global security and economic risk – as Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul illustrated in his opening speech (Federal Foreign Office).

This changes what risk analysis has to deliver. Mapping individual hazards is not enough. What matters is understanding how risks interact, where they reinforce one another and which systems become particularly vulnerable as a result.

2. Prevention is security policy – but is still treated as development policy

A recurring contradiction at the conference was the gap between growing attention to climate security and shrinking room for prevention, peace and humanitarian assistance.

Yet resilience is not only a moral or development investment. It is a security investment. The World Bank finds that every dollar invested in resilient infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries can generate around four dollars in benefits (World Bank/GFDRR, Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity).

One of the most apt statements of the conference was therefore:

“We have to stop discussing what it costs to act instead of what it costs not to act.”

This is where a central implementation gap lies: the cost of inaction is still rarely weighed systematically against the cost of preventive measures in political decisions.

3. Security and ecosystem protection are not necessarily in conflict

Particularly convincing were examples in which ecological restoration and security policy share the same space for action.

Finland, for instance, showed how rewetting peatlands in border regions can simultaneously support biodiversity, carbon storage and security interests: intact peatlands make it harder for heavy vehicles such as tanks to move.

The United Kingdom now explicitly treats biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse as national security risks (Defra, Nature Security Assessment).

This shifts the perspective: nature conservation is not only about protecting an ecological value. In many contexts, it is an investment in societal and national resilience. Or, as it was put at the conference:

“Investments in prevention have to be made not because nature is romantic or beautiful, but because it is essential for our survival.”

4. The real financing gap is a continuity gap

In the discussions on fragile and conflict-affected regions, one problem stood out: money is not always what is missing. What is often missing is reliable, flexible and long-term funding – and long-term means closer to ten years than three.

Short funding windows and shifting political priorities create cycles of disruption. There is also a gap between small local initiatives and large international programmes, as well as excessive reporting requirements from major donors that states in fragile contexts often cannot meet, or only at disproportionate cost. The decisive question is therefore not only how much money is available? but how can finance enable continuity?

This is especially relevant in regions where security conditions, institutional responsibilities and local power relations change quickly. Financing mechanisms must therefore enable, among other things:

• multi-year and flexible funding;
• an intermediate funding tier between micro-projects and large programmes;
• adjustment or replacement of implementing partners when the security situation changes;
• long-term follow-on funding;
• local and independent monitoring mechanisms.

5. Local actors are not stakeholders at the end of the value chain

A recurring pattern in the discussions on Sudan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Iraq and Syria was the mismatch between international project logic and local reality.

In fragile contexts, state structures sometimes do not function, do not enjoy trust or are themselves part of the conflict dynamic. Yet international financing mechanisms often require precisely these structures as the main entry point. This creates a paradox: those who know the risks best often have the least access to the resources needed to address them.

This became particularly clear in the discussions on the reconstruction of Syria and on the Amazon. Young people and local actors called not merely for consultation, but for genuine participation in decisions: “Nothing about us without us.”

For resilience policy, this means that local knowledge must not enter only at the implementation stage. It has to inform risk analysis, prioritisation, project design and monitoring from the outset.

6. Conflict sensitivity belongs in project design – not in the annex

The discussions on Somalia, Iraq, Bangladesh and Sudan revealed a further structural problem. A climate measure never takes place in a political vacuum. It changes access to land, water, infrastructure and resources – and can therefore also change local power relations.

A conflict analysis should therefore answer the following questions before a project starts:

• Who controls land and water?
• Who benefits from the intervention?
• Who might lose out?
• Which local power structures are strengthened?
• Which groups have no access to decision-making?
• How could the security situation affect implementation?

Conflict sensitivity must therefore not be an after-the-fact checkpoint. It has to become part of the decision-making architecture.

7. Heat shows most clearly what “systemic risk” means

The discussion on heat brought an often underestimated dimension of climate security to light. Heat differs from a flood or a storm: it is often less spectacular, but it acts over long periods and on many societal systems at once.

Heat increases health risks, reduces labour productivity and puts pressure on hospitals. At the same time, energy, transport and IT systems can fail, in turn affecting other critical infrastructure. Those hit hardest are people who are already structurally vulnerable – including older people, outdoor workers and persons with disabilities.

The Lancet Countdown documents the growing health impacts of global warming (WHO on the 2025 Lancet Countdown report). The conclusion from the conference was clear: “Heat remains invisible, but it is a risk that kills.” Heat protection is therefore not only health policy. It is critical-infrastructure, social, economic and security policy.

8. Peace remains the blind spot

Particularly striking was the gap between the growing recognition of climate security in security institutions and the still limited role of peace and security in international climate and environmental processes.

According to participants, agenda items on peace, security, gender equality and social participation were blocked by several states at UNCCD COP17 (Ulaanbaatar, August 2026). Peace actors were barely in the room. This creates an institutional paradox: we talk about climate as a security risk, yet continue to treat climate policy and peace policy largely separately.

The Rio Conventions therefore need stronger links with peace and security actors. Climate security must not remain a matter for foreign and defence policy alone.

Policy implications

1. Make resilience a criterion for security investments

Public investment in defence, infrastructure and security should be systematically assessed for its climate, ecosystem and resilience dimensions. This does not mean forcing a climate benefit onto every investment. Rather, it requires transparent criteria for co-benefits and trade-offs, with the assessment supported by independent scientific expertise.

2. Make the cost of inaction visible

Climate risks and their expected follow-on costs should be factored into budget planning, security strategies and infrastructure decisions. The question must shift from “What does prevention cost?” to “What does the absence of prevention cost?”

3. Design finance for continuity

International climate finance for fragile contexts should be longer-term, more flexible, more accessible to local actors and adaptable. Above all, it needs an intermediate funding tier through which local approaches can grow without immediately having to meet the requirements of large international programmes.

4. Make conflict analysis part of every intervention

For climate- and environment-related projects in fragile contexts, conflict sensitivity should be a mandatory part of project design – including ongoing review during implementation.

5. Strengthen local decision-making power

Communities, young people, Indigenous groups and local organisations should not merely be consulted. They need a share in decision-making and direct access to resources.

6. Link early warning to early action

A warning system alone does not prevent a crisis. Early-warning information must be linked to pre-defined action thresholds, responsibilities and funding. Early warning has to become early action.

7. Make vulnerability the basis for decisions

The conference showed a growing demand for integrated information on where risks arise, who is particularly affected, how risks interact and which options for action actually exist.

This calls for place-based vulnerability intelligence that combines scientific data with local knowledge and the logic of institutional decision-making.

Conclusion: from climate security to resilience by design

BCSC 2026 showed that the international debate has reached an important point: climate change is no longer understood merely as an environmental problem. The challenge now is to translate this understanding into institutions, budgets and decisions.

That does not require further separation between climate, security, development, health and peace policy. It requires decision-making approaches that bring these systems together where their risks and options for action actually meet. Resilience does not mean predicting the future precisely. It means recognising vulnerabilities early, making connections visible, identifying room for manoeuvre and adapting decisions to changing conditions in good time.

The most important message of the conference can therefore be summed up in one sentence:

Climate security is no longer primarily a knowledge gap. It is an implementation gap.

Closing this gap is the task for the next phase of climate security policy. In that spirit, there is only one thing left to say – in the words of Amelia Earhart, quoted at the conference: “The most effective way to do it, is to do it.”

Sources

• Berlin Climate and Security Conference 2026 – adelphi and German Federal Foreign Office
• Speech by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul at BCSC 2026, 6 October 2026
• World Bank/GFDRR – Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity
• Defra – Nature security assessment on global biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and national security, 20 January 2026
• WHO – Climate inaction is claiming millions of lives every year, warns new Lancet Countdown report, 29 October 2025